

# IoT under the Lens: Zeek and ELK Analytics

Simple and Efficient

# Kommunikations-Services Post

Der Motor für eine digitale und vernetzte Schweiz



#### Wir treiben die digitale Transformation in der Schweiz voran Unsere Mission





### Interaktionen – einfach, sicher, digital Wir orchestrieren ihre Kommunikation

	Weitere Industrien	КМО	Gesundheitswesen	Behörden				
	und Märkte	<b>KLARA</b>	E-Patientendossier	<b>DIALOG</b> <sup>6</sup>				
	(Finanzdienstieister & weitere)		Cuore B2B2C					
	In- & Ausland		Time4Patient	E-Voting-System				
Kommunikations- Plattformen	unpln 🗳							
Enabler-Services	💀 SwissID	SwissID Sign	Hacknowledge	terre <b>Active</b>				



# IoT under the Lens: Zeek and ELK Analytics

Simple and Efficient





### ~\$ whoami

### Romain Petro



→ Formerly Security Engineer (at Hacknowledge)
→ Formerly Team Leader (at Hacknowledge)
→ Currently SIEM Architect (at Hacknowledge)

Specialized on Microsoft Sentinel, Splunk and Elastic

Technical lead on the Elastic Stack → Maintenance, monitoring, enhancements



## About Hacknowledge

We provide simple, efficient and pragmatic solutions and services to improve our customers' cybersecurity maturity.

Switzerland: Headquarter and central hub for operations, incl. Datacenters

Luxembourg: Commercial representation for BENELUX clients, hub for Offensive security

52 employees – incl. 47 security engineers

ISO 27001 certification

majority shareholder since 2022

SWISS POST





#### **Sensors components**





### **IDS Setup problematics**

- 1. We setup Network Intrusion Detection systems on our sensors
- 2. We ask the customer to replicate the traffic of its network equipments
- 3. The customer doesn't always have the technical background to correctly setup a port mirroring
- → We end up with a partial network coverage on our customer networks

Few years ago, we added **Zeek** as a debug tool for IDS setup. Instead of a Tcpdump manual session, we bring more context for the customer:

- Which VLANs are we observing
- Which kind of protocols do we catch
- Which subnets are we monitoring



### **ELK Stack components**

#### Logstash

#### Logs management

- Free license
- Infinite volume
- Solution Open Source
- Important community
- Customizable for any source

#### 🔆 Kafka

#### Logs processing

- Fault tolerance
- High flow
- Small latency
- Ingestion variety



#### Database

- Open source
- Frequently updated
- Vitesse de traitement
- Multi format (noSQL)



#### **Search and Analytics**

- Easy to use for everyone
- Permissions split
- Logs access (low and high level)
- Security detections



RPE

#### **Common ELK Architecture**





## Zeek in a nutshell

- Open source Network Security Monitoring tool
- Formerly known as Bro
- ECS format (made for Elastic)
- 50+ log files
- Highly customizable

#### conn.log

- dns.log
- http.log
- files.log
- ftp.log
- ssl.log
- x509.log
- smtp.log
- ssh.log
- pe.log
- dhcp.log
- ntp.log
- SMB Logs (plus DCE-RPC, Kerberos, NTLM)
- irc.log
- rdp.log
- Idap.log and Idap\_search.log
- traceroute.log
- tunnel.log
- dpd.log
- known\_\*.log and software.log
- weird.log and notice.log
- capture\_loss.log and reporter.log



### Zeek architecture





### Zeek dashboards



### **ICS/IoT Environment**





### Zeek for IoT ?

- We almost deploy Zeek by default when we setup new sensors
- We need an easy and effective tool to monitor IoT environments
- We keep the same workflow for « usual » deployments and IoT ones
- Zeek can monitor IoT protocols:

BACnet 
BSAP 
DNP3 
EtherCAT 
EtherNet/IP 
GENISYS 
Modbus 
OPCUA Binary 
PROFINET 
S7comm 
Synchrophasor 
Best Guess

#### **Conclusion:** Let's use Zeek !



# Zeek Modbus - Raw logs



### Zeek Modbus - Dashboards



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## Zeek Modbus - Transforms (CMDB style)

	↑ source.address	destination.address.terms	∼ ze	eek.modbus.function.terms
~~	10.10.0.169	<pre>{     "172.18.38.45": 909404,     "192.168.102.28": 4967525,     "172.18.36.71": 112165384,     "172.18.34.163": 9086793,     "172.18.34.162": 4544017,     "172.18.36.70": 106036405,     "192.168.102.15": 1080441,     "172.18.36.69": 87357295,     "192.168.102.27": 4542429,     "192.168.102.25": 4542272 }</pre>	{	"READ_INPUT_REGISTERS_EXCEPTION": 421739, "READ_HOLDING_REGISTERS": 24676643, "READ_COILS": 5450719, "READ_INPUT_REGISTERS": 305137345
2	10.10.0.29	<pre>{     "172.18.38.61": 75112682,     "172.18.38.50": 75005528,     "172.18.32.168": 73463305,     "172.18.38.60": 74897132,     "172.18.34.62": 75127206 }</pre>	{	"WRITE_MULTIPLE_REGISTERS": 186933741, "READ_HOLDING_REGISTERS": 186672112



### Zeek Modbus - Machine Learning

#### Jobs

#### ml\_zeek\_modbushigh\_count\_by\_destination\_country 🧷

Security: Network - Looks for an unusually large spike in network activity to one destination country in the network logs. This could be due to unusually large amounts of reconnaissance or enumeration traffic. Data exfiltration activity may also produce such a surge in traffic to a destination country which does not normally appear in network traffic or business work-flows. Malware instances and persistence mechanisms may communicate with command-and-control (C2) infrastructure in their country of origin, which may be an unusual destination country for the source network.

security network

#### ml\_zeek\_modbushigh\_count\_network\_denies 🤌

Security: Network - Looks for an unusually large spike in network traffic that was denied by network ACLs or firewall rules. Such a burst of denied traffic is usually either 1) a misconfigured application or firewall or 2) suspicious or malicious activity. Unsuccessful attempts at network transit, in order to connect to command-and-control (C2), or engage in data exfiltration, may produce a burst of failed connections. This could also be due to unusually large amounts of reconnaissance or enumeration traffic. Denial-of-service attacks or traffic floods may also produce such a surge in traffic.

security network

#### ml\_zeek\_modbushigh\_count\_network\_events 🧷

Security: Network - Looks for an unusually large spike in network traffic. Such a burst of traffic, if not caused by a surge in business activity, can be due to suspicious or malicious activity. Large-scale data exfiltration may produce a burst of network traffic; this could also be due to unusually large amounts of reconnaissance or enumeration traffic. Denial-of-service attacks or traffic floods may also produce such a surge in traffic.



#### ml\_zeek\_modbusrare\_destination\_country 🧷

Security: Network - looks for an unusual destination country name in the network logs. This can be due to initial access, persistence, command-and-control, or exfiltration activity. For example, when a user clicks on a link in a phishing email or opens a malicious document, a request may be sent to download and run a payload from a server in a country which does not normally appear in network traffic or business work-flows. Malware instances and persistence mechanisms may communicate with command-and-control (C2) infrastructure in their country of origin, which may be an unusual destination country for the source network.





# Zeek Modbus - Anomaly Explorer

#### **Anomaly Explorer**

iii ✓ Feb 3, 2024 @ 01:52: → Feb 29, 2024 @ 17:29: 🤔 30 s 🔿 Updating

ml\_zeek\_modbushigh\_count\_network\_events // Edit job selection

G Filter by influencer fields... (source.ip : 10.10.0.169)





### Zeek Modbus – Anomalies

Anomalies							
Severity • critical ~	Interval Auto ~ ③						
Time	Severity $^{\odot}$ $\downarrow$	Detector	Influenced by	Actual®	Typical☉	Description	Actions
> February 13th 2024	• 96	high_count	destination.ip: 172.18.36.71 $\oplus$ $\bigcirc$ destination.ip: 172.18.36.70 $\oplus$ $\bigcirc$ destination.ip: 172.18.36.69 $\oplus$ $\bigcirc$ destination.ip: 172.18.34.62 $\oplus$ $\bigcirc$ destination.ip: 172.18.38.60 $\oplus$ $\bigcirc$ destination.ip: 172.18.38.61 $\oplus$ $\bigcirc$ destination.ip: 172.18.38.50 $\oplus$ $\bigcirc$ destination.ip: 172.18.38.50 $\oplus$ $\bigcirc$ destination.ip: 172.18.32.168 $\oplus$ $\bigcirc$ source.ip: 10.10.0.169 $\oplus$ $\bigcirc$ source.ip: 10.10.0.29 $\oplus$ $\bigcirc$ show less	293223	274234	↑ 1.1x higher	®
> February 23rd 2024	• 86	high_count	destination.ip: 172.18.36.71 $\oplus$ $\bigcirc$ destination.ip: 172.18.36.70 $\oplus$ $\bigcirc$ destination.ip: 172.18.36.69 $\oplus$ $\bigcirc$ destination.ip: 172.18.38.60 $\oplus$ $\bigcirc$ destination.ip: 172.18.38.60 $\oplus$ $\bigcirc$ destination.ip: 172.18.38.61 $\oplus$ $\bigcirc$ destination.ip: 172.18.34.62 $\oplus$ $\bigcirc$ destination.ip: 172.18.32.168 $\oplus$ $\bigcirc$ source.ip: 10.10.0.169 $\oplus$ $\bigcirc$ source.ip: 10.10.0.29 $\oplus$ $\bigcirc$ show less	294551	276416	↑ 1.1x higher	®



# Zeek with Elastic conclusions

#### + Pros

- Easy to setup
- No differenciation between IT and IoT environments
- Really flexible and customizable -> develop your own use-cases
- Good complementarity with the Elastic Agent for higher level machines
- Cons
- Huge amount of data to process/store
- Fully passive
- No real CMDB view



## ICS/IoT Security - Full Elastic coverage





# Thank you! Questions?

(See you soon)





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